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ABSTRACT
Th is contribution discusses two questions arising in relation to the defi nition of terrorist 
off ences in the Framework Decision on combating terrorism. Firstly, the question is 
considered as to what extent this defi nition contains a requirement of endangerment 
that Member States have to include in their national legislation. Secondly, the 
Framework Decision’s signifi cance for the position of activists, demonstrators and 
strikers will be addressed.
Keywords: combating terrorism; protest, demonstration and strike; terrorist intent
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e attacks on the Twin Towers in New York took place ten years ago. Partly in due of 
the attacks huge numbers of regulations directed at combating terrorism on a global, 
European and national level were subsequently enacted across the world. Soon aft er 
the 11  September 2001 attacks, the European Commission took the initiative to 
publish a Framework Decision on combating terrorism (‘the Framework Decision’).1 
Aft er some amendments, the Framework Decision was adopted as early as 13 June 
2002,2 in order to harmonise what constitutes criminal acts relating to terrorism in 
the national legislation of Member States.
Th e most important provision of the Framework Decision is Article 1, which 
describes the conditions in which criminal acts will be considered terrorist off ences. 
First of all, nine categories of behaviour are listed that, if committed intentionally, will 
* Professor of criminal law and criminal procedure, VU University Amsterdam, m.j.borgers@vu.nl.
1 COM(2001) 521 fi nal.
2 OJEC 2002, L 164/3.
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be considered terrorist off ences. Next, it is stated that these nine categories of 
behaviour must be “defi ned as off ences under national law, which, given their nature or 
context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation”. Finally, 
terrorist intent – that is, any of the varieties of intent mentioned in Article 1(1) – must 
be present.
Th is defi nition of terrorist off ences prompts several questions, of which I will 
discuss two in this contribution. I will fi rst discuss the second part of the defi nition in 
the Framework Decision, being the requirement that it concerns “off ences under 
national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or 
an international organisation”. To what extent was the stipulation of an independent 
requirement of endangerment intended? Secondly, the position of activists, 
demonstrators and strikers under this Framework Decision will be discussed. To what 
extent will criminal acts committed by such individuals fall within the defi nition of 
terrorist off ences? As will be shown, this question is closely connected to the meaning 
of ‘terrorist intent’, the third element of the defi nition of terrorist off ences in the 
Framework Decision.
2. REQUIREMENT OF ENDANGERMENT?
2.1. DIFFERENT POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS
It is usually assumed in literature that the phrase “which, given their nature or context, 
may seriously damage a country or an international organisation” should be regarded 
as an objective requirement for qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence.3 
It is argued that this means a requirement for the behaviour, given its nature and 
3 See S. Peers, ‘EU Responses to Terrorism’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2003, 
p. 228; E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, ‘Defi ning Terrorism’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminology 2004, p. 24; F. Verbruggen, ‘Bull’s-eye? Two Remarkable EU Framework Decisions 
in the Fight against Terrorism’, in: C. Fijnaut, J. Wouters & F. Naert (eds.), Legal Instruments in the 
Fight Against International Terrorism. A Transatlantic Dialogue, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2004, p. 318; E. Dumitriu, ‘Th e E.U.’s Defi nition of Terrorism: Th e Council Framework 
Decision on Combating Terrorism’, German Law Journal 2004, pp. 592 and 595–596; E.J. Husabø, 
‘Th e Implementation of New Rules on Terrorism through the Pillars of the European Union’, in: E.J. 
Husabø & A. Strandbakken (eds.), Harmonization of criminal law in Europe, Antwerp/Oxford: 
Intersentia 2005, pp. 61–62; B. Saul, Defi ning Terrorism in International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2006, p. 164; S. Voigt, ‘Der EU-Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung – 
ein wirksames Mittel der Terrorabwehr?’, in: E. Müller & P. Schneider (eds.), Die Europäische Union 
im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus: Sicherheit vs. Freiheit?, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2006, p. 216; E.J. 
Husabø, ‘Th e Interaction between Global, Regional and National Regulation in the Defi nition of 
Terrorism’, in: A. Follesdal, R.A. Wessel & J. Wouters (eds.), Multilevel Regulation and the EU. Th e 
Interplay between Global, European and National Normative Processes, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers 2007, p.  175 and C. Kreß & N. Gazeas, ‘Terrorismus’, in: U. Sieber, F.-H. Brüner, H. 
Satzger & B. Von Heintschel-Heinegg (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2011, 
p. 341.
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context, to pose a certain threat of politically or publicly motivated violence.4 It must 
be established, on the basis of the specifi c behaviour and the circumstances in which 
it took place, whether serious damage was caused to a country or an international 
organisation, or whether a certain threat of such damage existed. Th is can then be 
regarded as a requirement of endangerment. If no damage was caused and no threat 
of damage existed in a specifi c case, the qualifi cation ‘terrorist off ence’ would not 
apply. Th is establishes a clear distinction between terrorist and non-terrorist varieties 
of the punishable behaviour referred to in Article 1(1).5
Whether the draft ers of the Framework Decision indeed intended the second part 
of Article 1(1) to serve as an objective requirement is neither positively nor negatively 
evidenced by the history of the Framework Decision. Th ere may be some doubt as to 
whether the second part of Article 1(1) should in fact be interpreted as a ‘hard’ 
objective requirement.
If one concentrates, from a textual point of view, on the Dutch and German 
language versions,6 the quoted phrase could be regarded as a descriptive sub-clause, 
and not as a separate requirement. Th e text then plainly reads that, depending on their 
nature or context, the nine categories of punishable behaviour listed may seriously 
damage a country or an international organisation. In this interpretation a sort of 
explanation of the nine categories of punishable behaviour is given: these off ences are 
in abstracto so serious that they are generally suited – or, to formulate it more 
cautiously, not in themselves unsuited – to seriously damaging a country or 
international organisation.7 Th is does not mean that the serious damage, or the 
chance thereof, will manifest itself on each occasion. Th e punishable behaviour 
referred to in this Article certainly does not have to be specifi cally directed against a 
country or international organisation.
In the English and French versions, however, Article 1(1) reads somewhat 
diff erently from the Dutch and German versions. Th e quoted phrase in these versions 
appears to be connected with terrorist intent: the behaviour may, given the nature or 
context, cause serious damage to a country or international organisation if it is 
4 Cf. B. Saul 2006, pp. 38 and 61 with respect to the type of violence.
5 E. Dumitriu 2004, p. 592 and S. Voigt 2006, p. 216. Also cf. E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou 2004, pp. 
25–26.
6 Th e fi rst part of Article 1(1) in the German language version of the Framework Decision states that 
“Jeder Mitgliedstaat trifft   die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um sicherzustellen, dass die unter den 
Buchstaben a) bis i) aufgeführten, nach den einzelstaatlichen Rechtsvorschrift en als Straft aten 
defi nierten vorsätzlichen Handlungen, die durch die Art ihrer Begehung oder den jeweiligen 
Kontext ein Land oder eine internationale Organisation ernsthaft  schädigen können, als 
terroristische Straft aten eingestuft  werden, wenn sie mit dem Ziel begangen werden, (…)”. In the 
Dutch language version: “Iedere lidstaat neemt de maatregelen die noodzakelijk zijn om ervoor te 
zorgen dat de onder a) tot en met i) bedoelde opzettelijke gedragingen, die door hun aard of context 
een land of een internationale organisatie ernstig kunnen schaden en die overeenkomstig het 
nationale recht als strafb are feiten zijn gekwalifi ceerd, worden aangemerkt als terroristische 
misdrijven, indien de dader deze feiten pleegt met het oogmerk om (…)”.
7 Cf. E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou 2004, p. 25.
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committed with terrorist intent.8 In this interpretation of Article 1(1), terrorist intent 
colours the nature of the off ence and the circumstances in which it is committed. Th e 
off ender’s objective of causing serious damage to a country or international 
organisation is contained in the terrorist intent.9 Th e reference to ‘nature or context’ 
could then be seen as a reference to the combination of an inherently serious criminal 
act and the presence of terrorist intent, with the factual consequence that the specifi c 
behaviour may seriously damage a country or international organisation.
It is also possible to establish a link in another way between the nature and/or 
context of the specifi c behaviour on the one hand and the presence of terrorist intent 
on the other. Not only does the existence of that intent say something about the 
endangerment posed by the specifi c behaviour, but something about the existence of 
terrorist intent can also be inferred from the nature and context of the behaviour.10 
Some acts are of such a serious and destructive nature that, even if nothing is known 
about the off ender’s objective, this indicates the act was committed with terrorist 
intent. Here the emphasis is not on setting an independent requirement of 
endangerment resulting from the nature and/or context of the specifi c behaviour, but 
instead on establishing a form of evidence in which that nature and context are key.
2.2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN TERRORIST AND NON-TERRORIST 
OFFENCES
Th e above shows that the second part of Article 1(1) can be interpreted and applied 
such that it is not considered an independent and objective requirement for qualifying 
punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. In view of the diff erent approaches to the 
phrase “given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an 
international organisation”, it can furthermore be concluded that there are essentially 
two possible ways of distinguishing the terrorist off ences listed in Article 1(1) from 
non-terrorist off ences.
8 Th e fi rst part of Article 1 in the English language version of the Framework Decision states that 
“Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to 
below in points (a) to (i), as defi ned as off ences under national law, which, given their nature or 
context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with 
the aim of: (…) shall be deemed to be terrorist off ences (…)”. In the French language version: 
“Chaque État membre prend les mesures nécessaires pour que soient considérés comme infractions 
terroristes les actes intentionnels visés aux points a) à i), tels qu’ils sont défi nis comme infractions 
par le droit national, qui, par leur nature ou leur contexte, peuvent porter gravement atteinte à un 
pays ou à une organisation internationale lorsque l’auteur les commet dans le but de: (…)”.
9 Here I consider seriously intimidating a population to be on a par with seriously damaging a country.
10 Cf. E.J. Husabø 2005, p.  61; B. Saul 2006, p.  164 and T. Weigend, ‘Th e Universal Terrorist. Th e 
International Community Grappling with a Defi nition’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 
2006, pp. 924 and 931–932. B. Saul adds (in note 209) that in the UN Convention on Suppression of 
Financing of Terrorism, which constituted a source of inspiration for the draft ing of the Framework 
Decision, the mentioning of the nature or context of the punishable behaviour was specifi cally 
meant to avoid a need to prove a “subjective mental state”.
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Firstly, this distinction can be made primarily on the basis of the degree of 
endangerment in the specifi c punishable behaviour.11 Th e second part of Article 1(1) 
is then regarded as a separate (objective) requirement. Th e main consequence of this 
view is that the existence of terrorist intent is not the decisive factor in qualifying 
punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. In other words, punishable behaviour 
within the meaning of Article 1(1) can be committed with terrorist intent, but will not 
be qualifi ed as a terrorist off ence if the degree of endangerment represented by that 
behaviour – in relation to a country or international organisation – is insuffi  cient. 
Th is, it is argued, creates a certain protective mechanism, specifi cally in relation to 
political activist acts with a relatively minor eff ect.12
A question that can be raised in relation to this fi rst approach is whether the 
requirement of endangerment as envisaged here makes it too diffi  cult to qualify 
punishable behaviour as terrorist. Weigend stated that, as far as the letter of the law is 
concerned, the requirement is relatively strict in that an act must cause damage to an 
entire country or an international organisation, or at least create a real risk of such 
damage. If this requirement is strictly applied, qualifi cation as terrorist intent is 
confi ned to the most heinous and dangerous acts. Consequently, an act of the 
magnitude of the 11  September 2001 attacks would qualify as such, but whether a 
‘normal’ bomb attack by the IRA or ETA would is unclear.13 However, whether the 
requirement of endangerment should be viewed so strictly is not evident. It is true that 
the 11 September 2001 attacks acted as a catalyst for the Framework Decision, but 
there is nothing to suggest that the Framework Decision should automatically be 
assigned such a limited scope of applicability. Furthermore, the question of what 
constitutes ‘serious damage’ is also similarly vague,14 such that a less far-reaching 
explanation may suffi  ce. Weigend has consequently sought to provide a basis for a 
diff erent explanation:
“A sensible interpretation of this clause might take as the point of reference for any ‘damage’ 
the ability of the state to credibly fulfi l its main functions of providing basic means of 
survival and infrastructure as well as fundamental public security to its citizens. ‘Damage’ 
to these functions can occur through large-scale interference with the provision of water, 
energy and traffi  c routes but also through random attacks on individuals, which put into 
question the state’s ability to provide protection for life and limb”.15
Th is point of departure would allow the range of acts falling under the scope of 
terrorist off ences to be wider than those of 11  September 2001, without losing the 
11 ‘Primarily’ because the existence of terrorist intent – the third part of Article 1(1) – is then also a 
requirement.
12 Cf. F. Verbruggen 2004, p.318, who argues that “isolated cases of politically motivated violence” 
cannot be considered to be terrorist off ences.
13 T. Weigend 2006, p. 927.
14 Cf. also E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou 2004, p. 26 and S. Voigt 2006, p. 225.
15 T. Weigend 2006, p. 930 (note 79).
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emphasis on the need for serious damage, or the chance thereof, to be created for a 
country as a whole (or an international organisation).
Conversely, it is also possible to opt for a relatively fl exible rather than for a 
relatively strict interpretation of the requirement of endangerment. Th is could be 
opted for on the grounds that it can be diffi  cult to ascertain the degree to which 
specifi c behaviour in a specifi c case has the ability to seriously damage a country or an 
international organisation. Possession of weapons and explosives, one of the off ences 
listed in Article 1(1), is an example of this. Whether such possession is intended to 
seriously damage a country or international organisation cannot be determined solely 
on the basis of the off ence itself. More information about what the person involved 
planned to do with the weapons or explosives would be needed. Similar considerations 
apply with respect to off ences that do not go beyond an attempt or which have a 
diff erent – in other words, less serious – eff ect than was intended, such as a bomb that 
does not explode or causes far less damage than the off ender had hoped. Against this 
background, a court could decide that it is suffi  cient to interpret the requirement of 
endangerment in a manner that ties in with the nature of the committed off ence: is 
the off ence generally suited to seriously damaging a country or an international 
organisation? In addition, or instead, a link could be sought with the off ender’s 
intention: can it be derived from this intention that there was a chance of serious 
damage to a country or international organisation? In this approach, the requirement 
of endangerment is viewed in close conjunction with the fi rst and/or third part of 
Article 1(1). Such a fl exible interpretation of the requirement of endangerment is not 
contrary to the wording of the Framework Decision as serious damage is not required 
actually to occur; the possibility thereof is suffi  cient.16
Secondly, the existence or absence of terrorist intent can be regarded as the criterion 
distinguishing the terrorist off ences listed in Article 1(1) from non-terrorist off ences. 
In this approach, the causing of serious damage, or the chance thereof, to a country or 
international organisation is not deemed totally irrelevant since the endangerment 
criterion is to a certain extent incorporated in the nine categories of punishable 
behaviour referred to in Article 1(1).17 Th is list refers to serious punishable behaviour 
that is in itself suited to causing serious damage to a country or international 
organisation. Such damage, or at least the chance thereof, will usually occur if an act 
is committed with terrorist intent. A key aspect in this approach is that it avoids 
burdening the court with the more concrete, but diffi  cult assessment whether there 
was a chance of serious damage to a country or international organisation. Hence, the 
16 Cf. also V. Hameeuw, ‘Strafb aarstelling van terroristische misdrijven: van Europees Kaderbesluit 
tot het Belgische Strafwetboek’ [‘Penalizing terrorist off ences: from the European Framework 
Decision to the Belgian Criminal Code’], Tijdschrift  voor Strafrecht 2005, p. 6.
17 A certain condition is contained herein. If the list of punishable forms of behaviour in Article 1(1) 
were more elaborate and had thus also included less serious off ences, it may have been necessary to 
give the second part of Article  1(1) a useful and independent role as an objective requirement 
restricting the possibility to qualify punishable behaviour as terrorist off ence.
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decisive question concerns the off ender’s objective: if that objective comes down to 
terrorist intent, punishment for committing a terrorist off ence is possible.
Th ere is a certain cohesion between these two approaches. As noted above, it 
cannot be excluded that the existence or absence of terrorist intent is taken into 
consideration when interpreting the requirement of endangerment. At the same time 
it is conceivable that the existence of terrorist intent will be inferred from the nature 
and context of the specifi c behaviour. Th is does not alter the fact that both approaches 
are clearly and essentially diff erent. Th e fi rst approach, in which the degree of 
endangerment is the key issue, is objective in nature. Contrastingly, the second 
approach is subjective in nature.
2.3. COMMISSION’S APPROACH
As noted above, no clear choice was made during the realisation of the Framework 
Decision as to how the second part of Article 1(1) should be interpreted. Th e 
Commission’s original proposal for the Framework Decision on combating terrorism 
appears to have made the distinction between terrorist and non-terrorist off ences 
primarily on the basis of the existence or the non-existence of terrorist intent.18 Th e 
Commission’s reports evaluating the implementation of the Framework Decision by 
the Member States do not explicitly indicate how the Commission views the meaning 
of the second part of Article 1(1).19 Simply nothing is said about whether or not to 
include the second part as an objective requirement for qualifying punishable 
behaviour as a terrorist off ence. It can be concluded from this that the Commission 
does not in any case object to a Member State’s inclusion of such a requirement as an 
element in national regulations.20 If the Commission did not regard the second part of 
Article 1(1) as an independent requirement for qualifying punishable behaviour as a 
terrorist off ence, it would most likely have raised an objection and claimed that, by 
including such a requirement in national regulations, Member States were setting 
more stringent requirements than allowed by the Framework Decision.
It should also be noted that the Commission does not criticize Member States 
electing not to implement the second part of Article 1(1) as an independent 
requirement. In my opinion, this can be explained by the fact that the Framework 
Decision strives for minimum harmonisation.21 Th e Framework Decision does not 
preclude Member States from setting less stringent requirements; in other words, 
making it easier to qualify punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. Th is means 
18 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2001) 521 fi nal, p. 7. Cf. also B. Saul 2006, p. 163.
19 See COM(2004) 409 fi nal, SEC(2004) 688, COM(2007) 681 fi nal and SEC(2007) 1463.
20 As, for instance, in the case of Belgium (Article 137(1) Belgian Criminal Code, see V. Hameeuw 
2005, pp. 5–6) and Germany (§129a, subsection 2, German Criminal Code).
21 Th e legal basis for the Framework Decision is found in Article 31(1)(e) of the former EU Treaty, 
pursuant to which measures can be adopted to draw up minimum regulations with respect to the 
elements of criminal acts and with respect to punishment.
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that it is ultimately up to each Member State to decide whether to include the 
requirement of endangerment contained in the second part of Article 1(1) as an 
element in national regulations on terrorist off ences.
2.4. CONCLUSION
Based on the above considerations it can fi rst be concluded that it is diffi  cult to 
establish whether the Framework Decision regards the requirement of endangerment 
contained in Article 1(1) to be an element of terrorist off ences. Several interpretations 
are defensible. However, the practical importance of that debate – and this is the 
second conclusion – is minor as the Framework Decision leaves Member States the 
freedom to deviate from the description in Article 1(1) insofar as they are allowed to 
set fewer requirements than those set out in the Framework Decision. Th e fact 
remains, however, that the nature of the specifi c behaviour is not necessarily 
completely without signifi cance, even if a Member State does not include the 
requirement of endangerment in its national penal system. Th at signifi cance, however, 
relates fi rst and foremost to whether there is deemed to be terrorist intent. Proof of 
terrorist intent depends not only on what those involved state as their motives, but 
also on objective circumstances that may be taken into consideration. Th ese may 
include the extent to which a country or international organisation has been, or could 
have been, seriously damaged. In that case, the approach opted for is subjective in 
nature, but allows the existence of terrorist intent to be assumed partly on the basis of 
objective circumstances. Th e Framework Decision allows this approach.
3. POSITION OF ACTIVISTS, DEMONSTRATORS AND 
STRIKERS
3.1. TERRORIST INTENT AS A DISTINGUISHING CRITERION
In order to clarify the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers under the 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism, it is important – for the reasons stated 
below – to specifi cally interpret the meaning of terrorist intent. According to the 
Framework Decision, terrorist intent can occur in three forms: a. the off ender intends 
to seriously intimidate a population, b. the off ender intends to unduly compel a 
government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any 
act, or c. the off ender intends to seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental 
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organisation.
Interestingly, from an international perspective it is not common to require a 
terrorist intent. Several treaties relating to certain terrorist acts have been adopted 
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since 1963.22 Most of these do not, however, contain a specifi c description of the 
‘terrorist’ aspect of such acts, but merely refer to a certain type of off ences. Terrorism 
is combated in this framework by applying ‘normal’ investigative powers and coercive 
measures, as well as through prosecutions for ‘ordinary’ criminal acts. Th is allows an 
adequate response to terrorist activities, providing suffi  cient facilities are in place to 
investigate, prosecute and punish the acts in question.
Th e Framework Decision on combating terrorism opts, however, for a diff erent 
approach in this respect as it specifi cally regards terrorist intent, at least in part, as an 
distinguishing criterion. Whether this is the best choice is open to discussion, which 
I will not enter on this occasion.23 Considering that terrorist intent has been given 
such a prominent place in the Decision, it is important to clarify the meaning and 
scope of this intent.
3.2. MEANING OF TERRORIST INTENT
A much de bated question in literature is the relationship between terrorist intent and 
the political or ideological motives underlying the act.24 Does terrorist intent coincide 
with such a motive, or should intent and motive be distinguished from each other? 
Th e three-way classifi cation formulated by Weigend, based on the study of various 
international regulations relating to the combating of terrorism, is instructive in this 
respect. He writes:
“Terrorists typically pursue a triple goal: they have ‘normal’ intent to commit the base 
crime of murder, bombing, assault, etc.; they intend, further, to intimidate a group or the 
population as a whole and/or to compel others to take action (e.g. to release political 
prisoners); and they have ulterior political or ideological motives, e.g. to destabilize the 
present government or to defeat a rival religion or ideology. Legal instruments diff er as to 
the extent to which they require all or only some of these ideal-typical subjective elements 
for a terrorism conviction”.25
Considering the text of Article 1(1), it can be noted that “ulterior political or ideological 
motives” do not form part of the defi nition of terrorist off ences. It is suffi  cient for the 
off ender to act with ‘normal’ intent, as well as with terrorist intent within the meaning 
22 For a detailed discussion of this, see B. Saul 2006, pp. 129–190.
23 See, for example, T. Weigend 2006, pp. 918–922 and H. van der Wilt, ‘In Search of Motive: 
Conceptual Hazards in the Quest for a Proper Defi nition of Terrorism’, in: G. Molier, A. Ellian & D. 
Suurland (eds.), Terrorism: Ideology, Law and Policy, Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing 
2011, p. 241–244.
24 Religious motives could also be added to political and ideological motives. However, I consider 
religious motives also to be political or ideological motives as religious beliefs, in the context of 
terrorism, are commonly closely connected to, or can be translated into, political and ideological 
ideas. Th is does not alter the fact that what is stated in the main text also applies to religious motives, 
if these are to be considered a separate category.
25 T. Weigend 2006, p. 923.
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of Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision.26 Th is choice is not entirely self-evident. It 
is specifi cally the existence of such a motive that is usually seen as an essential element 
of a terrorist act.27 At the same time, there are a number of reasons as to why political 
or ideological motives should not be included in legal defi nitions of terrorism.28 First 
of all, there are many criminal law systems in which motive does not play a role. It is 
the act that is punishable, not the motive behind it. Closely related to this is the second 
reason: the impression should be avoided that the prosecution is driven fi rst and 
foremost by a person’s political or ideological views. Not requiring a political or 
ideological motive avoids the need to identify the existence of such a motive during 
the investigation and trial phase. Th irdly, proving a motive can be problematic as it 
can be diffi  cult to demonstrate that an off ender has a deep-rooted drive if the motive 
does not manifest itself in some way. Fourthly, delineating the terms ‘political’ and 
‘ideological’ may cause controversy.
Terrorist intent distinguishes itself from political and ideological motives in that it 
does not refer to an off ender’s deep-rooted drive,29 but rather to the eff ect pursued 
through the conduct. A key aspect is that it can be established that the off ender intends 
to seriously intimidate a population and so on, but not why he is pursuing that 
objective. Th e terrorist intent will usually, of course, follow from a political or 
ideological motive, and the desired aim – to seriously intimidate a population and so 
on – will usually also be a means to achieving a political or ideological goal. However, 
a court wanting to regard an act as a terrorist off ence does not have to establish what 
the motive behind the act is.
Th e above shows that, as far as terminology is concerned, a clear distinction can 
and should be made between political and ideological motives on the one hand and 
terrorist intent on the other. Th is applies in any case in relation to Article 1(1) of the 
Framework Decision.30 Th e question arises, however, as to whether such a strict 
distinction can also be made in a substantive sense. Can terrorist intent indeed be 
established without any regard for the off ender’s political or ideological motives? 
Proof of terrorist intent will in any event be easier to establish if the off ender’s political 
26 Cf. E. Dumitriu 2004, pp. 596–597; S. Voigt 2006, pp. 216–217 and T. Weigend 2006, p. 924. E.J. 
Husabø 2005, p. 60, distinguishes less sharply between terrorist intent and the motive. He appears 
to equate terrorist intent with the motive (‘the subjective motivation’).
27 T. Weigend 2006, pp. 923–924.
28 On this, see B. Saul 2006, pp. 40–45, who also adds some comments qualifying these reasons. See 
also in this respect the debate between B. Saul, ‘Th e Curious Element of Motive in Defi nitions of 
Terrorism: Essential Ingredient of Criminalising Th ought?’, in: A. Lynch, E. MacDonald & G. 
Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror, Sydney: Federation Press 2007, p. 28–38 and 
K. Roach, ‘Th e Case for Defi ning Terrorism With Restraint and Without Reference to Political or 
Religious Motive’, in: A. Lynch, E. MacDonald & G. Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the War on 
Terror, Sydney: Federation Press 2007, p. 39–48.
29 Or, in the words of B. Saul 2007, p. 28: “the emotion or belief prompting the prohibited physical 
conduct”.
30 Whether such a distinction can be made as strictly in the context of national law, given the manner in 
which terms such as intent and motive are used, is a diff erent matter, and one that I will not discuss here.
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or ideological motives are known.31 It is not unusual for off enders or an underlying 
organisation to claim responsibility for terrorist attacks and to provide an explanation 
as to the underlying motives. If, however, an off ender’s political or ideological motives 
are unclear, the existence of terrorist intent – and thus to a certain extent the 
underlying motive, too – could be inferred from objective circumstances such as the 
nature and context of the specifi c behaviour. Th erefore, knowledge of the political or 
ideological motives is not strictly necessary.32
Another relevant question is whether the defi nition of terrorist off ences becomes 
too broad if political and ideological motives are disregarded. Does ignoring them 
carry the risk of including conduct within the scope of the defi nition that generally is 
not regarded as a terrorist act? In answering this question we can draw on Saul’s 
conclusion that “there is considerable support for the view that terrorism is political 
violence”. Th us, terrorist acts distinguish themselves from “privately motivated 
violence”.33 Saul argues that a requirement such as terrorist intent is insuffi  cient to 
distinguish between these two forms of violence. Th e existence of terrorist intent can 
stem from “private concerns such as blackmail, extortion, criminal profi t or even 
personal duties”.34 Possible examples could include people planting bombs in random 
places, while indicating that they are willing to stop these acts in return for a large 
sum of money. In such cases the off enders can be said to be aiming to seriously 
intimidate the population (as anyone can be a victim of these bombs) and that terrorist 
intent therefore exists, while this intent does not stem from political or ideological 
motives, but instead purely from fi nancial considerations. If such forms of “privately 
motivated violence” are to be distinguished from typical terrorist acts, the underlying 
motive has again to be considered.35
It cannot generally be distilled from the legislative history of the Framework 
Decision on combating terrorism as to how the draft ers dealt with the matter of 
whether to stipulate the existence of political or ideological motives as a requirement 
for qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. Whether this has to do with 
the reasons given above for not including political or ideological motives in the legal 
defi nition of terrorism, or with an approach as to what should be considered terrorist 
that is fundamentally diff erent from Saul’s aforementioned opinion, cannot be said 
31 Cf. about possible complications: B. Saul 2006, p. 42.
32 Inferring a terrorist intent from objective circumstances carries a certain risk as the distinction 
between terrorist and non-terrorist crimes does not lie solely in the act that is carried out. Th e 
distinction lies more, at least in part, in the objective – the terrorist intent – of the off ender. If this 
specifi c subjective requirement is objectifi ed too much, the distinction between terrorist and non-
terrorist off ences will blur. See T. Weigend 2006, p. 924.
33 B. Saul 2006, p. 38.
34 B. Saul 2006, p. 61 and B. Saul 2007, p. 30.
35 B. Saul 2006, p. 61 and B. Saul 2007, p. 29. For a contrary view, see Roach 2007, p. 47, who – without 
giving specifi c reasons – argues that applying terrorist intent as a requirement “allows most crime 
committed for fi nancial gain to be distinguished from those designed to change governmental 
policy or scare the public at large”.
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with certainty.36 Th e only thing that is clear is that such a requirement has not been set. 
Due to this, the Framework Decision has avoided stipulating a requirement that may 
be diffi  cult to apply. At the same time, the scope of the defi nition of terrorist off ences 
has proved to be rather broad in that it can also include behaviour that is not typically 
terrorist. More remains to be said, however, about terrorist intent within the meaning 
of Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision. During the process of draft ing the 
Framework Decision, some attention was paid to the scope of the defi nition of terrorist 
off ences, specifi cally with regard to the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers.
3.3. DELINEATION REGARDING ACTIVISTS, DEMONSTRATORS 
AND STRIKERS
During the realisation of the Framework Decision, the draft ers decided to further 
delineate the defi nition of terrorist off ences in a variety of ways. Apparently, this is 
because the Commission’s original proposal for this Framework Decision, as the 
Explanatory Memorandum indicates, also had to cover “acts of urban violence”.37 
Such violence is easily associated with violence occurring as part of demonstrations 
by anti-globalists and other political activists.38 Th is was opposed by several Member 
States as demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest cannot and should not be 
linked to terrorism.39 Before dealing with the legal interpretation of this issue, it is 
useful to indicate when demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest could fall 
within the scope of the defi nition of terrorist off ences. Th e basic requirement is for a 
criminal act as referred to in Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision to be committed. 
Where criminal acts are committed during demonstrations, strikes or other forms of 
protest, they will not usually be regarded as punishable behaviour within the meaning 
of Article 1(1), which includes attacks upon a person’s life and seizure of aircraft . But 
is not completely unrealistic either. An example would be the causing of extensive 
destruction as referred to in Article 1(1)(d). If such a criminal act were to be committed, 
the objective of the protest action – which is usually aimed at changing or, conversely, 
maintaining an existing situation – could be linked to terrorist intent, specifi cally the 
intent to unduly compel a government (or international organisation) to perform or 
abstain from performing any act. Th is is not precluded by the text of Article 1(1) of the 
Framework Decision.40 Th e question, however, is whether this is also intended.
36 Cf. for instance the argument of Roach, 2007, who claims that political or ideological motives 
should not play a role in the legal defi nition of terrorism.
37 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2001) 521 fi nal, p. 11.
38 Th e Commission’s proposal was published shortly aft er protests by anti-globalists had taken place 
in Gothenburg and Genoa. In addition, according to O. Gross & F. Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis. 
Emergency Powers in Th eory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 415, 
comments on the proposal were published on the Commission’s website in which reference was 
made to “radicals committing violence”.
39 O. Gross & F. Ní Aoláin 2006, pp. 415–416.
40 See also E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou 2004, pp. 27–28 and F. Verbruggen 2004, p. 324.
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Th is issue received attention during the negotiations on the text of the Framework 
Decision. It can be concluded from Council documents that a majority of the Member 
States wanted to tie in with the description of terrorism as expressed in the UN 
Convention on Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, while other Member States 
pressed for “the most stringent defi nition possible, in order to ensure that legal action, 
as, for example, in the framework of actions by union or anti-globalisation groups, 
could under no circumstance fall within the scope of application of the framework 
decision”.41 Th e way in which terrorist intent is worded in the fi nal Framework 
Decision is described as “a text (…) which achieves a balance between the need to 
eff ectively combat terrorist crimes and, at the same time, guarantees the fundamental 
rights and freedoms”.42 Although not explicitly stated in Council documents, the 
Member States appear to have attempted to achieve this balance by adding the word 
“unduly” in that part of the defi nition of terrorist intent that pertains to compelling a 
government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any 
act, whereas this word is absent in the UN convention.
Th e concerns about the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers infl uenced 
the Framework Decision in other respects, too. Firstly, the text of Article 1(2) of the 
Framework Decision stipulates that the Framework Decision “shall not have the eff ect 
of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal 
principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union”. Th is provision 
is, to some degree, worked out in more detail in the preamble. Th e preamble states 
under 10 inter alia that:
“Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as being intended to reduce or 
restrict fundamental rights or freedoms such as the right to strike, freedom of assembly, of 
association or of expression, including the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions 
with others for the protection of his or her interests and the related right to demonstrate”.
Note can also be taken of the joint and unanimous statement prepared by the Member 
States at the time of the adoption of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism:
“Th e Council states that the Framework Decision on the fi ght against terrorism covers acts 
which are considered by all Member States of the European Union as serious infringements 
of their criminal laws committed by individuals whose objectives constitute a threat to 
their democratic societies respecting the rule of law and the civilisation upon which these 
societies are founded. (…) Nor can it be construed so as to incriminate on terrorist grounds 
persons exercising their fundamental right to manifest their opinions, even if in the course 
of the exercise of such right they commit off ences”.43
41 See Council document 12647/2/01 REV 2, p. 2 and Council document 12647/3/01 REV 3, p. 2.
42 Ibid.
43 See declaration 109/02, included in Annex II of Council document 11532/02.
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Th e fact that delineation was sought along various lines indicates that, in spite of the 
balance the parties attempted to achieve when defi ning terrorist intent, the text of 
Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision does not in itself draw any clear demarcation 
line between terrorist and political activist behaviour.44 At that same time, the text of 
Article 1(2), the preamble and the statement together show that punishable behaviour 
occurring in a situation in which fundamental rights, specifi cally the right to strike 
and freedom of expression, are exercised should not be considered a terrorist off ence.45
But have suffi  cient safeguards been put in place to ensure that the behaviour in 
such cases will not be qualifi ed as terrorism? Peers has pointed out that when 
interpreting European law, the European Court of Justice tends not to assign much 
signifi cance to statements given at the time of legal instruments being established if 
the contents of these statements cannot be found in the text of the regulation 
concerned.46 For that reason, Peers claims that “the legal eff ect of the statement” is 
uncertain.47 Two arguments can be raised against this stance. First of all, it is 
important to note that although the European Court of Justice does not consider itself 
bound in general to include Member States’ statements in the interpretation of 
European law, this does not mean that such statements are categorically excluded 
from being an aid to interpreting that law. Th ere are examples of cases in which the 
Court, directly or indirectly, has made use of statements, both unanimous and 
otherwise, of Member States.48 Secondly, Peers seems to ignore the fact that the 
contents of the statement in this case tie in closely with the provisions of Article 1(2) 
of the Framework Decision and that the contents can in that sense be found in the text 
of the regulation concerned. Although the text of the statement is admittedly far more 
specifi c than the text of Article 1(2), the European Court of Justice seems in situations 
such as these to adopt a generous stance and to be prepared to further specify the text 
of the regulation, using a statement by the Member States.49 In addition, the text of the 
preamble, too, can play an important role in the interpretation.50
Th ere is no obstacle, therefore, to take the text of Article 1(2), the preamble and the 
statement in consideration in the interpretation of Article 1(1). When these sources 
are considered in relationship to each other, the result, in my opinion, is that the 
44 Cf. also E.J. Husabø 2005, pp. 62–63 and O. Gross & F. Ní Aoláin 2006, pp. 416–417.
45 S. Peers 2003, p. 237. Cf. also S. Voigt 2006, p. 227 and B. Saul 2006, p. 165.
46 S. Peers 2003, p. 236, with reference to ECJ 26 February 1991, case C-292/89 (Antonissen), ground 
18. See also inter alia ECJ 13 February 1996, Cases C-197/94 and C-252/94 (Bautiaa and Société 
Française Maritime), ground 51; ECJ 17  October 1996, cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/98 
(Denkavit International), ground 29 and ECJ 8 June 2000, case C-375/98 (Epson Europe), ground 26.
47 S. Peers 2003, p. 236. Cf. also S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Aff airs Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2011, p. 786.
48 On this see inter alia S. Schønberg & K. Frick, ‘Finishing, refi ning, polishing: on the use of travaux 
préparatoires as an aid to the interpretation of Community legislation’, European Law Review 2003, 
pp. 165–167.
49 Cf. ECJ 3 December 1998, case C-368/96 (Generics), grounds 25–27.
50 See, for example, ECJ 3 May 2007, case C-303/05 (Advocaten voor de Wereld), ground 28.
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description of terrorist off ences must be interpreted in such a manner that terrorist 
intent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an act involves a protest, 
demonstration or strike in which punishable behaviour within the meaning of Article 
1(1) occurs. Th is will prevent a situation in which rallies in which pressure to change 
or maintain a certain situation is exerted in a legitimate way are suddenly considered 
terrorist if they spiral out of control. At the same time, the interpretation advocated 
here will prevent punishable behaviour from escaping being regarded as a terrorist 
off ence simply on the grounds that it has to be regarded as protest action.
One thing should be noted, however. As stated above, the Framework Decision 
strives for minimum harmonisation. It does not preclude Member States from 
stipulating that fewer requirements need to be met for punishable behaviour to qualify 
as a terrorist off ence. Member States can in principle, therefore, opt to disregard the 
restriction on the concept of terrorist off ences in relation to activists, demonstrators 
and strikers, as understood in respect of the Framework Decision. As soon, however, 
as Member States use that freedom, they also need to realise that fundamental rights 
such as the freedom of expression will also independently impose restrictions. It is 
precisely because of these fundamental rights, which the Framework Decision on 
combating terrorism does not seek to aff ect adversely, that it may be expected of the 
Member States that they will respect the limits ensuing from the Framework Decision.
4. CONCLUSION
As explained here, the second part of the defi nition of terrorist off ences in Article 1(1) 
of the Framework Decision does not compel Member States to include a requirement 
of endangerment in national regulations penalizing these off ences. Strictly speaking, 
the second part could therefore be omitted from the defi nition. Member States are, 
however, free to opt to include a requirement of endangerment in order to avoid the 
scope of application of the concept of terrorist off ences becoming too broad. Th e 
second part could also be regarded as relevant for objectively establishing terrorist 
intent. It has been shown, in relation to the position of activists, demonstrators and 
strikers, that the description of terrorist off ences must be interpreted in such a manner 
that terrorist intent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an act involves a protest, 
demonstration or strike in which punishable behaviour within the meaning of Article 
1(1) occurs at some point. Insofar as not already apparent from the description of 
terrorist off ences in national criminal law, the court is in this respect obliged to 
interpret the description of the off ence in conformity with the Framework Decision.
